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A company linked to Baroness Michelle Mone and her husband Doug Barrowman owes £39m in tax – but is unlikely every to pay because it is in receivership and doesn’t have the funds.
The tax debt comes on top of the £148m it was ordered to pay the government for breaching a contract to supply PPE.
Here’s the BBC:
“Documents filed by PPE Medpro’s administrator on Tuesday revealed the figure owed to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC).
“PPE Medpro was put into administration last month, and Health Secretary Wes Streeting said the government would pursue the company “with everything we’ve got” to recover the cash.
“PPE Medpro has £672,774 available to unsecured creditors, far less than the money owed to the DHSC, the administrators’ filings show.”
Now brace yourself for the information showing how PPE Medpro’s owners are getting away without paying a penny…
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“During the outbreak of the Covid pandemic in 2020, the government scrambled to secure supplies of PPE as the country went into lockdown and hospitals across the country were reporting shortages of clothing and accessories to protect medics from the virus.
“In May that year, PPE Medpro was set up by a consortium led by Baroness Mone’s husband, Doug Barrowman, and won its first government contract to supply masks through a so-called VIP lane after being recommended by Baroness Mone.
“The Department of Health and Social Care sued PPE Medpro and won damages over claims the company breached its contract to supply medical gowns.
“Mr Barrowman told the BBC in an interview in 2023 that he was the ultimate beneficial owner of PPE Medpro. The shares are held in the name of an accountant, Arthur Lancaster, according to Companies House documents.
“In that same interview he admitted receiving more than £60m in profits from PPE Medpro.
“Baroness Mone, best known for founding the lingerie company Ultimo, admitted that millions of pounds from those profits were put into a trust from which she and her children stood to benefit.
“An Isle of Man company linked to Mr Barrowman, Angelo (PTC), has a secured debt of £1m to the PPE Medpro, which means it is likely to rank ahead of government creditors when it comes to paying out whatever cash can be recovered from the company.
“The administrators’ report says it expects there will be enough money to repay this in full.
“Filings in the Isle of Man show the beneficial owner of Angelo (PTC) is Knox House Trust, part of Barrowman’s Knox group of companies.”
It seems reasonable to infer that PPE Medpro is a fake company, set up to sell useless equipment and then funnel the money elsewhere, leaving it liable for any fines and taxes but unable to pay them, so the people behind it got away scot free.
A scam, in short.
Look at the evidence:
PPE Medpro was created in May 2020, at the height of the government’s panic-buying phase, when due-diligence was severely weakened. This is typical of opportunistic vehicles.
It secured contracts not through open competition but via a politically connected route – the illegal so-called ‘VIP lane’ – after being recommended by Baroness Mone. This is a classic vulnerability point for procurement abuse.
The gowns failed sterility certification. That moves this from “bad business” into “non-performance”, which strengthens the inference that fulfilling the contract was not the primary motive.
Barrowman admitted receiving more than sixty million pounds in profits. Millions then moved into a trust benefiting Mone and her children. This suggests the company’s function was to extract value rapidly.
The company’s owners used intermediaries and offshore structures – shares were owned by an accountant, not by Barrowman directly; a linked Isle of Man company (Angelo PTC) has a secured claim that jumps ahead of HMRC and DHSC; and Barrowman has beneficial ownership through Knox House Trust. These structures allow profits to be insulated while liabilities are left with the contracting entity.
PPE Medpro now has less than £700,000 available to unsecured creditors despite having handled contracts worth hundreds of millions, and owes £148 million for the failed contract and £39 million in taxes. It cannot pay. Meanwhile, the individuals involved have already banked the profits.
That pattern — profits removed, liabilities left — is consistent with a classic limited-liability buffer used in extraction schemes.
Taken together, these elements align with a deliberate structure designed to:
– win public contracts through insider access,
– extract very large profits quickly,
– use layered ownership and offshore entities to shield beneficiaries,
– leave the operating company insolvent once liabilities crystallise.
In plain analytical terms, this fits the hallmarks of a procurement-extraction scheme.
What is a “procurement-extraction” scheme
A procurement-extraction scheme is one in which a company is created or used primarily to win public contracts, extract large sums of money quickly, and then collapse or disappear once liabilities emerge. The defining features are structural rather than legal labels.
Core elements include:
Insider access or reduced scrutiny
Contracts are obtained through political connections, VIP lanes, or emergency procurement rules that dilute due-diligence.
Rapid value extraction
Profits are taken out immediately — often through dividends, management fees, inter-company loans, or transfers to offshore entities. Little capital is left inside the operating company.
Minimal operational substance
The company may be newly formed, have few staff, or outsource everything. Its capacity to fulfil the contract is limited or non-existent.
Limited-liability firewall
When the product or service fails, or when tax bills and damages arise, the company has no remaining assets. Because it is a separate legal entity, those who extracted the profits are insulated.
Use of intermediaries and opaque ownership
Beneficial owners may be hidden behind nominee shareholders, trusts, or offshore structures. This distances the individuals from the liabilities.
Insolvency as the endgame
The company enters administration or liquidation with large public debts but very little recoverable money.
This type of structure appears legitimate on paper, but in practice it operates like a one-way valve: public money flows in; profits are siphoned out; liabilities remain inside the empty shell.
That is what the PPE Medpro pattern resembles.
Could the government of the day have realised that this firm was fake?
It was entirely possible for the government of the day to realise that PPE Medpro was not a normal supplier.
Several indicators were visible at the time, not only in hindsight.
The problem was that emergency procurement rules, political pressure, and the VIP lane created conditions where these red flags were not acted upon.
Key reasons the government could have known include:
It was a newly incorporated company
PPE Medpro was created in May 2020 and awarded major contracts almost immediately. Normal procurement practice treats new shell companies as high-risk, especially for contracts involving hundreds of millions of pounds.
It had no relevant trading history or capacity
There was no established record of medical-grade PPE production or supply. A routine capacity assessment would have revealed this.
The VIP lane bypassed scrutiny
Suppliers in the politically connected referral route were prioritised and processed at extraordinary speed.
Internal documents later showed that VIP-lane referrals were given far better chances of securing contracts. This reduced the opportunity for officials to block unsuitable firms.
The size of the contract was large
Awarding a contract worth more than £100 million to a brand-new company should have triggered enhanced due-diligence checks, including financial capability, supply chain verification, and product certification reviews. It didn’t.
There was a lack of certification evidence
Proper sterility certification should have been confirmed before signing the contract. If this step was skipped or rushed, it was a failure of the contracting authority.
There may have been warnings from within government
In a number of VIP-lane cases, civil servants recorded concerns about supplier legitimacy, product quality, or due diligence being overridden.
While specific internal warnings about PPE Medpro have not been fully disclosed, the pattern across the VIP lane shows systemic awareness of risk.
The offshore structures used by PPE Medpro were known to be suspicious
The ownership and financial setup — trusts, nominees, Isle of Man connections — is the sort of structure that routinely triggers enhanced scrutiny in public procurement because it increases the risk of fraud, tax avoidance, and non-recoverability.
In summary: the available information was sufficient for a functioning procurement system to identify PPE Medpro as a high-risk or unsuitable supplier.
The reason it was not stopped is that the process was distorted by urgency, political influence, and the VIP lane’s reduced checks, allowing a company that would normally fail basic due diligence to receive vast contracts.
Is it possible that ministers colluded with company bosses to extract this money?
It is possible, but it cannot be asserted as fact without formal evidence, that the environment was extremely favourable to exploitation.
The facts allow, but do not prove:
– Conscious collusion, in which one or more ministers knowingly facilitated a company’s ability to extract public funds during the pandemic.
– Improper influence, in which political connections shaped contract awards in a way that materially disadvantaged due diligence.
The pattern — political access, weak scrutiny, rapid profit extraction, corporate insolvency once liabilities appear — is compatible with collusion. It is also compatible with gross negligence, regulatory capture, or panic-driven procurement failures amplified by the VIP lane.
Only investigatory findings, disclosures, or legal proceedings could convert that possibility into an evidence-based conclusion.
Is it possible to bring the perpetrators to justice?
There are both civil and criminal routes to bring those responsible to justice, and some are already in motion in this case:
Civil recovery / contract litigation — government can sue the company for breach of contract and seek repayment (which is what happened in the High Court ruling against PPE Medpro). But recovery via insolvency is difficult if the company is bankrupt or funds have been moved out.
Criminal investigation and prosecution — offences that can be pursued include fraud (eg fraud by false representation), money laundering, bribery (the Bribery Act), and related conspiracies. In the UK such investigations can be carried out by the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in appropriate cases, and police forces.
The NCA has been reported to be investigating elements of the PPE procurement cases.
Asset freezes / unexplained wealth / restraint orders — authorities can seek freezing orders and restraint orders to preserve assets while investigations / civil claims proceed.
Parliamentary and public-law mechanisms — inquiries, select-committee investigations, and judicial review can examine ministerial conduct, procurement rules and systemic failures. The Public Accounts Committee and other parliamentary processes have already scrutinised the VIP lane and specific contracts.
There are real-world constraints and challenges:
- Burden of proof: criminal cases require proof beyond reasonable doubt. Civil cases require a lower standard but recovery depends on available assets.
- Corporate complexity: transfers to related companies or trusts (especially offshore) can put funds out of reach and make recovery slow and expensive.
- Time and resources: serious fraud investigations are complex and can take years. The existence of ongoing investigations (NCA, asset freezes, civil litigation) shows the system can act, but outcomes aren’t guaranteed.
The verdict
Legal and criminal routes exist and are being used in this case (High Court judgment, NCA investigation, asset freezes). Recovery and prosecution are possible but legally and practically challenging.
If you want to push for accountability politically: contact your MP, support or push for parliamentary committee follow-up (Public Accounts Committee, Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee), back organisations that litigate and investigate (Good Law Project, Transparency International UK), and ask for FOI releases about procurement decisions and due diligence.
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Mone-linked PPE Medpro owes a fortune in taxes. Was it a con from the start?
Share this post:
A company linked to Baroness Michelle Mone and her husband Doug Barrowman owes £39m in tax – but is unlikely every to pay because it is in receivership and doesn’t have the funds.
The tax debt comes on top of the £148m it was ordered to pay the government for breaching a contract to supply PPE.
Here’s the BBC:
“Documents filed by PPE Medpro’s administrator on Tuesday revealed the figure owed to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC).
“PPE Medpro was put into administration last month, and Health Secretary Wes Streeting said the government would pursue the company “with everything we’ve got” to recover the cash.
“PPE Medpro has £672,774 available to unsecured creditors, far less than the money owed to the DHSC, the administrators’ filings show.”
Now brace yourself for the information showing how PPE Medpro’s owners are getting away without paying a penny…
Support Vox Political!
With social media algorithms acting as gatekeepers – allowing users to read only what their owners want them to, sites like Vox Political need the support of our readers like never before.
You can help by making a donation:
https://Ko-fi.com/voxpolitical
“During the outbreak of the Covid pandemic in 2020, the government scrambled to secure supplies of PPE as the country went into lockdown and hospitals across the country were reporting shortages of clothing and accessories to protect medics from the virus.
“In May that year, PPE Medpro was set up by a consortium led by Baroness Mone’s husband, Doug Barrowman, and won its first government contract to supply masks through a so-called VIP lane after being recommended by Baroness Mone.
“The Department of Health and Social Care sued PPE Medpro and won damages over claims the company breached its contract to supply medical gowns.
“Mr Barrowman told the BBC in an interview in 2023 that he was the ultimate beneficial owner of PPE Medpro. The shares are held in the name of an accountant, Arthur Lancaster, according to Companies House documents.
“In that same interview he admitted receiving more than £60m in profits from PPE Medpro.
“Baroness Mone, best known for founding the lingerie company Ultimo, admitted that millions of pounds from those profits were put into a trust from which she and her children stood to benefit.
“An Isle of Man company linked to Mr Barrowman, Angelo (PTC), has a secured debt of £1m to the PPE Medpro, which means it is likely to rank ahead of government creditors when it comes to paying out whatever cash can be recovered from the company.
“The administrators’ report says it expects there will be enough money to repay this in full.
“Filings in the Isle of Man show the beneficial owner of Angelo (PTC) is Knox House Trust, part of Barrowman’s Knox group of companies.”
It seems reasonable to infer that PPE Medpro is a fake company, set up to sell useless equipment and then funnel the money elsewhere, leaving it liable for any fines and taxes but unable to pay them, so the people behind it got away scot free.
A scam, in short.
Look at the evidence:
PPE Medpro was created in May 2020, at the height of the government’s panic-buying phase, when due-diligence was severely weakened. This is typical of opportunistic vehicles.
It secured contracts not through open competition but via a politically connected route – the illegal so-called ‘VIP lane’ – after being recommended by Baroness Mone. This is a classic vulnerability point for procurement abuse.
The gowns failed sterility certification. That moves this from “bad business” into “non-performance”, which strengthens the inference that fulfilling the contract was not the primary motive.
Barrowman admitted receiving more than sixty million pounds in profits. Millions then moved into a trust benefiting Mone and her children. This suggests the company’s function was to extract value rapidly.
The company’s owners used intermediaries and offshore structures – shares were owned by an accountant, not by Barrowman directly; a linked Isle of Man company (Angelo PTC) has a secured claim that jumps ahead of HMRC and DHSC; and Barrowman has beneficial ownership through Knox House Trust. These structures allow profits to be insulated while liabilities are left with the contracting entity.
PPE Medpro now has less than £700,000 available to unsecured creditors despite having handled contracts worth hundreds of millions, and owes £148 million for the failed contract and £39 million in taxes. It cannot pay. Meanwhile, the individuals involved have already banked the profits.
That pattern — profits removed, liabilities left — is consistent with a classic limited-liability buffer used in extraction schemes.
Taken together, these elements align with a deliberate structure designed to:
– win public contracts through insider access,
– extract very large profits quickly,
– use layered ownership and offshore entities to shield beneficiaries,
– leave the operating company insolvent once liabilities crystallise.
In plain analytical terms, this fits the hallmarks of a procurement-extraction scheme.
What is a “procurement-extraction” scheme
A procurement-extraction scheme is one in which a company is created or used primarily to win public contracts, extract large sums of money quickly, and then collapse or disappear once liabilities emerge. The defining features are structural rather than legal labels.
Core elements include:
Insider access or reduced scrutiny
Contracts are obtained through political connections, VIP lanes, or emergency procurement rules that dilute due-diligence.
Rapid value extraction
Profits are taken out immediately — often through dividends, management fees, inter-company loans, or transfers to offshore entities. Little capital is left inside the operating company.
Minimal operational substance
The company may be newly formed, have few staff, or outsource everything. Its capacity to fulfil the contract is limited or non-existent.
Limited-liability firewall
When the product or service fails, or when tax bills and damages arise, the company has no remaining assets. Because it is a separate legal entity, those who extracted the profits are insulated.
Use of intermediaries and opaque ownership
Beneficial owners may be hidden behind nominee shareholders, trusts, or offshore structures. This distances the individuals from the liabilities.
Insolvency as the endgame
The company enters administration or liquidation with large public debts but very little recoverable money.
This type of structure appears legitimate on paper, but in practice it operates like a one-way valve: public money flows in; profits are siphoned out; liabilities remain inside the empty shell.
That is what the PPE Medpro pattern resembles.
Could the government of the day have realised that this firm was fake?
It was entirely possible for the government of the day to realise that PPE Medpro was not a normal supplier.
Several indicators were visible at the time, not only in hindsight.
The problem was that emergency procurement rules, political pressure, and the VIP lane created conditions where these red flags were not acted upon.
Key reasons the government could have known include:
It was a newly incorporated company
PPE Medpro was created in May 2020 and awarded major contracts almost immediately. Normal procurement practice treats new shell companies as high-risk, especially for contracts involving hundreds of millions of pounds.
It had no relevant trading history or capacity
There was no established record of medical-grade PPE production or supply. A routine capacity assessment would have revealed this.
The VIP lane bypassed scrutiny
Suppliers in the politically connected referral route were prioritised and processed at extraordinary speed.
Internal documents later showed that VIP-lane referrals were given far better chances of securing contracts. This reduced the opportunity for officials to block unsuitable firms.
The size of the contract was large
Awarding a contract worth more than £100 million to a brand-new company should have triggered enhanced due-diligence checks, including financial capability, supply chain verification, and product certification reviews. It didn’t.
There was a lack of certification evidence
Proper sterility certification should have been confirmed before signing the contract. If this step was skipped or rushed, it was a failure of the contracting authority.
There may have been warnings from within government
In a number of VIP-lane cases, civil servants recorded concerns about supplier legitimacy, product quality, or due diligence being overridden.
While specific internal warnings about PPE Medpro have not been fully disclosed, the pattern across the VIP lane shows systemic awareness of risk.
The offshore structures used by PPE Medpro were known to be suspicious
The ownership and financial setup — trusts, nominees, Isle of Man connections — is the sort of structure that routinely triggers enhanced scrutiny in public procurement because it increases the risk of fraud, tax avoidance, and non-recoverability.
In summary: the available information was sufficient for a functioning procurement system to identify PPE Medpro as a high-risk or unsuitable supplier.
The reason it was not stopped is that the process was distorted by urgency, political influence, and the VIP lane’s reduced checks, allowing a company that would normally fail basic due diligence to receive vast contracts.
Is it possible that ministers colluded with company bosses to extract this money?
It is possible, but it cannot be asserted as fact without formal evidence, that the environment was extremely favourable to exploitation.
The facts allow, but do not prove:
– Conscious collusion, in which one or more ministers knowingly facilitated a company’s ability to extract public funds during the pandemic.
– Improper influence, in which political connections shaped contract awards in a way that materially disadvantaged due diligence.
The pattern — political access, weak scrutiny, rapid profit extraction, corporate insolvency once liabilities appear — is compatible with collusion. It is also compatible with gross negligence, regulatory capture, or panic-driven procurement failures amplified by the VIP lane.
Only investigatory findings, disclosures, or legal proceedings could convert that possibility into an evidence-based conclusion.
Is it possible to bring the perpetrators to justice?
There are both civil and criminal routes to bring those responsible to justice, and some are already in motion in this case:
Civil recovery / contract litigation — government can sue the company for breach of contract and seek repayment (which is what happened in the High Court ruling against PPE Medpro). But recovery via insolvency is difficult if the company is bankrupt or funds have been moved out.
Criminal investigation and prosecution — offences that can be pursued include fraud (eg fraud by false representation), money laundering, bribery (the Bribery Act), and related conspiracies. In the UK such investigations can be carried out by the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in appropriate cases, and police forces.
The NCA has been reported to be investigating elements of the PPE procurement cases.
Asset freezes / unexplained wealth / restraint orders — authorities can seek freezing orders and restraint orders to preserve assets while investigations / civil claims proceed.
Parliamentary and public-law mechanisms — inquiries, select-committee investigations, and judicial review can examine ministerial conduct, procurement rules and systemic failures. The Public Accounts Committee and other parliamentary processes have already scrutinised the VIP lane and specific contracts.
There are real-world constraints and challenges:
The verdict
Legal and criminal routes exist and are being used in this case (High Court judgment, NCA investigation, asset freezes). Recovery and prosecution are possible but legally and practically challenging.
If you want to push for accountability politically: contact your MP, support or push for parliamentary committee follow-up (Public Accounts Committee, Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee), back organisations that litigate and investigate (Good Law Project, Transparency International UK), and ask for FOI releases about procurement decisions and due diligence.
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