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The public has lashed back against Keir Starmer’s plan to introduce digital ID cards, with a massive response to a petition calling for it to be scrapped.

The petition – originally launched in July – has picked up millions of signatures since Starmer announced his plan on September 26,  with the total standing at around 2.4 million at the time of writing.

That scale of public resistance tells us something crucial: it is being received not as a harmless innovation, but as a threat.

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The announcement has all the hallmarks of a classic political “dead cat” – a deliberately provocative issue thrown into the news cycle to shift attention away from more pressing problems for the prime minister.

Within weeks of Parliament returning from the summer recess, his government has faced high-profile resignations, internal leaks, and rumours that Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham is weighing a Labour leadership challenge.

By lobbing digital ID onto the table, Starmer ensures headlines are dominated by debates over privacy, state surveillance, and the fairness of mandatory ID, rather than internal Labour turmoil.

The e‑petition gives the public a focal point for outrage, but also serves the prime minister’s immediate purpose: guaranteeing media coverage and forcing commentators and MPs to react to this story rather than the succession speculation.

The government claims the digital ID will crack down on illegal working, secure borders, and deliver benefits — making identity checks simpler, faster, and more reliable.

The plan is to hold this digital identity in a smartphone app (along the lines of the NHS App), storing a person’s name, date of birth, nationality or residency status, and a photo.

Proponents argue that this will prevent fraudulent documents, make employers’ checks more efficient, and reduce the black market appeal of false identities.

But the petition’s popularity suggests that citizens are instinctively sceptical.

They are resisting not just an unwelcome policy, but a fundamental shift in the relationship between individual and state. The flaws are legion.

First – security: a national digital identity system necessarily centralises personal data on a vast scale — creating, in effect, a nationwide honeypot for cybercriminals.

No matter how strong the encryption, the system will be an irresistible target. If it was breached, the fallout would be enormous: identity theft, financial fraud, lasting harm to reputations, and loss of trust in public institutions.

In practice, even highly guarded systems fall over time; building a fortress doesn’t guarantee invulnerability.

There is a second danger: the creeping expansion of system use, often called “function creep.”

The government may claim the system is limited to work checks today, but once the infrastructure exists, there is no obvious stopping point.

The same digital ID could be required for banking, welfare, housing applications, healthcare, travel, and even voting.

Every use leaves a trace, building a comprehensive log of a person’s movements and interactions.

Once that data web exists, it becomes a tool — willingly or not — of surveillance and social control. What starts as a convenience can become a mechanism of oppression.

And what of the Blair family’s history with the issue?

Tony Blair was the prime minister who first tried to impose ID cards in the 2000s, and he has continued to promote digital identity schemes since leaving office.

His son, Euan Blair, now runs Multiverse, a technology and training company valued in the billions.

Although there is no evidence that Multiverse is directly involved in the government’s current ID contracts – which have so far gone to firms like Deloitte, BAE Systems and PA Consulting – the connection has inevitably fuelled suspicions.

For critics, the fact that Tony Blair is still cheerleading for IDs while his son is a high-profile tech entrepreneur raises concerns over conflicts of interest, whether or not they can be proved.

Worse, the system threatens exclusion and inequality.

Millions of people in the UK lack reliable access to smartphones, digital literacy, or stable internet.

For older citizens, low-income households, people in rural or remote areas, or those with no fixed address, imposing a digital-only identity regime risks pushing them further to the margins.

The argument may be made that there will be fallback or offline verification, but in practice these are often weaker, slower, and more cumbersome — precisely the opposite of “convenience.”

Those least able to navigate bureaucratic hurdles will pay the highest price.

The government’s track record with big IT programmes gives further cause for doubt.

The UK has already experienced major failures: cost blowouts, delays, poor integration, security flaws, and loss of public confidence.

The abandoned gov.uk Verify is a clear warning.

How confident should we be that this time, with even more sensitive data and higher stakes, events will end differently?

The risk is that billions will be poured into a system that doesn’t work properly, with public funds paying the hidden cost, potentially diverting from important public services.

Errors are virtually inevitable.

A misplaced digit, a corrupted entry, a mismatched photo — any such glitch could become existential: someone might be wrongly denied access to a job, a benefit, or a service.

Fixing such errors in government databases is already slow and painful; imagine that challenge when your right to work or access essential services depends on flawless identity verification.

This magnifies the consequences of what might otherwise be a clerical mistake.

Then there is the issue of liberty.

The notion that free citizens should be compelled to carry or present a state-controlled identity is deeply at odds with foundational ideas of personal autonomy.

Mandating a digital ID chips away at anonymity and gives the state far more capacity to track, profile, and discriminate.

Civil liberties advocates warn that such systems are loaded with risk — not just data misuse, but bias, unequal enforcement, and oppressive surveillance.

What begins as a “public good” can become a coercive architecture of control.

Perhaps most importantly, the scheme doesn’t actually solve the problem it claims to address.

Employers already have a legal duty to check that staff have the right to work in the UK.

That requirement has not prevented illegal work, because those determined to evade it move into the “grey economy,” where cash payments and informal arrangements dominate—outside formal checks.

A digital ID adds a layer of bureaucracy for lawful workers, but it does nothing to stop those operating outside the formal system.

The policy is, in fact, addressing symptoms rather than root causes.

In launching this plan now, under the glare of intense political turbulence, Starmer may hope it will reset the narrative — but the petition shows the public is not so easily diverted.

This is not just a policy error.

It is a misjudgment of public mood: too intrusive, too dangerous, too full of promises that cannot be delivered.

Can the government force through a programme of this scale against the will of such a vocal majority — or will this be the issue that kills its legitimacy?

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