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The UK government has commenced what it calls a “world-first” crackdown on people-smuggling gangs through a new sanctions regime.

Ministers have now published a list of 25 sanctioned individuals and one Chinese company — accused of everything from selling small boats to trafficking refugees across the Balkans.

The message from Foreign Secretary David Lammy is loud and clear: “We know who you are, and we will make you pay.”

But this is policy for headlines, not for meaningful reform.

Behind the dramatic language and international reach lies a strategy that is legally opaque, operationally weak, and ethically dangerous.

From strategy to spectacle

On July 22, the government announced sweeping powers under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, allowing it to freeze assets, impose travel bans, and disqualify directors of UK companies suspected of involvement in people smuggling.

By the very next day, they had named their first round of targets — including alleged gang leaders in Albania, Serbia, and Iraq, hawala money handlers in the Middle East, and a Chinese outdoor company that sells inflatable boats online.

Here’s the full list, supplied by the UK government:

Iraqi-linked people-smuggling

• Goran Assad Jalal, formed part of an organised crime group which stowed migrants in refrigerated lorries which crossed the English Channel from France to the United Kingdom on at least ten occasions between January and March 2019.
• Hemin Ali Salih, helped smuggle migrants into the UK in the backs of lorries.
• Dedawan Dazey, a people-smuggler who runs safe houses for migrants in Northern France before they are smuggled to the United Kingdom.
• Roman Ranyaye, an Iraqi people-smuggler responsible for the smuggling of migrants from Asia to Europe.
• Azad Khoshnaw, for supplying inflatable boats, onboard motors and other maritime equipment for use in people-smuggling of migrants from France to the UK.
• Nuzad Khoshnaw, for equipping gangs in Northern France with outboard motors, inflatable boats, and other maritime equipment for use in people-smuggling to the UK.
• Nihad Mohsin Xoshnaw, for providing inflatable boats, outboard motors and other maritime equipment used by migrants to cross the English Channel from France.

Hawala Network

• Muhammed Khadir Pirot, a hawala banker who controls payments from people being smuggled from the Kurdistan region of Iraq to Europe via Turkey.
• Mariwan Jamal, controls money movements through a Hawala banker, which handles payments to people smugglers from migrants in Iraq.
• Rafiq Shaqlaway, involved in hawala banking as an advisor to migrants looking to pay smugglers operating routes into Europe via Turkey.

North African gangs operating in the Balkans

• Kazawi Gang, a people-smuggling network which controls people-smuggling routes from North Africa into the EU known to deal out harsh punishments to migrants who are unable to pay.
• Tetwani Gang, known as one of the Balkan’s most violent people-smuggling gangs, members are reported to hold migrants for ransom and sexually abuse women unable to pay their fees.

Gangland bosses

• Bledar Lala, leads a smuggling ring moving people from Belgium across the English Channel to the UK.
• Alen Basil, a former police translator who through violence and intimidation became boss of a large people-smuggling network.
• Mohammed Tetwani, the head of the ‘Tetwani’ gang and self-styled “King” of Horgos in Serbia.
• Yassine Al Maghribi Al-Kasaoui, the boss of the “Kazawi” gang.

Balkan gangs supplying fake passports

• Kavač Gang, a Balkan organised crime organisation known to use fake passports to smuggle its gang members between the Balkans and Turkey.
• Škaljari Gang, an organised crime organisation in Montenegro that smuggles criminals between the Balkans and Turkey.
• Dalibor Ćurlik, procures fake passports and forged documents for use in the Kavač gang’s people-smuggling.
• Almir Jahović, member of the Kavač gang, which is involved in supplying fake passports for smuggling gang members across borders
• Marko Petrović, a member of the Kavač gang which sources false identification and passports for use in people-smuggling.
• Nikola Vein helps the Škaljari Gang secure fake passports and travel documents for use in people smuggling.
• Ratko Živković, a Škaljari Gang associate, which gathers fake passports for the purpose of smuggling gang members across borders.
• Dejan Pavlović, a member or close associate of the Škaljari Gang, which supports the manufacture of false identities and passports.

The following company based in China has been designated over the manufacture of inflatable boats being advertised for people smuggling.

• Weihai Yamar Outdoors Product Co

In purely theatrical terms, this is a bold debut: global reach, a tight media narrative, and brutal-sounding villains.

But in practice, this move raises serious concerns about how the UK defines criminality, applies justice, and treats migration as a threat instead of a humanitarian challenge.

Trial by sanction — without evidence in court

The most fundamental problem is that none of these individuals have been tried in a UK court.

The entire regime rests on the power to designate people or companies as “sanctionable” based on secret intelligence, without public evidence, cross-examination, or independent oversight.

The individuals can be stripped of access to UK bank accounts and blacklisted internationally — all on the say-so of civil servants and ministers.

Yes, some targets may well be violent criminals.

But others are simply alleged enablers, tarred by proximity to smuggling routes or by working within informal financial systems.

There is no way for the public — or those listed — to know what the actual evidence is.

This is not due process. It is punishment by decree.

Guilt by association: hawala, boats, and the criminalisation of survival

Among those named are hawala money handlers — informal financial brokers widely used in parts of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

These systems exist precisely because the Western banking infrastructure is often inaccessible or hostile to the communities most in need.

Labelling hawala users “enablers of organised crime” risks criminalising entire diaspora communities, remittance flows, and forms of financial trust built outside Western norms.

Then there’s Weihai Yamar Outdoors Product Co, a Chinese company allegedly advertising small boats for smuggling purposes.

But how does one prove intent when advertising inflatable rafts online?

Are they knowingly aiding criminals — or just caught in the crossfire of keyword policing and moral panic?

Violence is real — but so is political convenience

To be clear: some of the named individuals, such as Mohammed Tetwani, the so-called “King of Horgos,” or the Kazawi gang, are reportedly involved in horrific abuses.

If evidence supports that, they should face arrest and trial.

But it’s equally clear that this regime is designed to deliver political theatre, not justice.

The announcement was made just after Parliament went into summer recess — meaning no immediate scrutiny, no debate, no accountability.

It’s a ready-made press release for the evening news: stern ministerial faces, a list of “villains,” and tough talk about border security.

And it allows Labour to claim it’s “tough on illegal migration” without fixing the broken asylum system, expanding safe routes, or addressing the human consequences of border militarisation.

A migration policy built on coercion, not compassion

This new regime is part of a broader “disrupt, deter, return” strategy.

The emphasis is overwhelmingly punitive: stop the smugglers, block the migrants, deport those who arrive.

But nowhere does it address why people risk their lives in dinghies and trucks: war, climate disaster, persecution, and poverty.

Nor does it offer legal alternatives for those seeking safety.

The asylum backlog remains enormous.

Detention centres are overcrowded.

Legal aid is hollowed out.

And refugee sponsorship schemes are limited and overly bureaucratic.

By treating migration as a criminal conspiracy — rather than a global crisis of displacement and desperation — this regime ensures the UK stays in reaction mode, never reforming its approach at the root.

Foreign policy masquerading as justice

The government calls this “innovative foreign policy.” What it looks like is a glorified blacklist.

• There are no pathways for delisting or appeal in practice.

• There’s no transparency around what intelligence was used.

• There’s no evidence this will dismantle actual smuggling operations, which are fluid, decentralised, and resilient to disruption.

You can freeze a gang leader’s assets in Serbia, but it won’t stop the next desperate family from seeking passage — it just means someone new will offer it, often at greater risk and higher cost.

A policy of distraction, not resolution

This new sanctions regime is a distraction, not a solution.

It shifts the spotlight away from the UK’s failures — in processing asylum claims, in providing safe routes, in treating migrants humanely — and pins the blame on foreign villains and shadowy networks.

That might win a few headlines and quiet the right-wing press.

But it doesn’t change the fact that the system is broken — and that no amount of sanctions will stop people from trying to survive.

Until the UK embraces a migration policy based on rights, safety, and justice, this is just another chapter in the long war on migrants.

It is a sanctions regime with global ambitions — but no moral compass.

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