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Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair has controversially been put forward by the White House (and other international actors) to head a transitional authority in Gaza.

The so-called Gaza International Transitional Authority (GITA) would temporarily govern the territory, assuming broad political, administrative, and legal powers, before eventually returning control to the Palestinians.

That’s a big claim. It would require Hamas to be removed from control of Gaza, and peace to be restored there – unlikely, considering Israel’s current genocidal war campaign there.

According to reports, the authority would initially operate from Egypt, near Gaza’s southern border, and would only enter the Strip once it is considered stable.

A multinational security force would accompany it, tasked with maintaining order and supporting governance. So: more violence.

Central to the plan is the removal and disarmament of Hamas, whose entrenched control over Gaza has persisted despite nearly two years of Israel’s genocide.

The transitional authority would oversee appointments, legislation, and reconstruction for up to five years, with the stated goal being to prepare Gaza – or whatever is left of it – for eventual incorporation as part of a Palestinian state.

Proponents of the plan point to international transitional administrations in East Timor and Kosovo as models, but the parallels are imperfect and the challenges of Gaza are uniquely complex.

The potential flashpoints are numerous and serious: Gaza remains devastated by war, with widespread destruction of homes and infrastructure, shortages of electricity and water, and thousands displaced.

Winning the trust and cooperation of Gazans, many of whom may view any Western-led intervention with suspicion, would be difficult.

At the same time, dismantling Hamas without provoking renewed conflict or mass displacement is a daunting prospect.

Any failure to deliver essential services or maintain security could delegitimise the authority almost immediately, making the GITA’s task exceptionally fragile.

Critics of Blair’s potential appointment argue that he is an especially unsuitable choice.

His record as UK prime minister is controversial – most notably his decision to take the UK into the 2003 Iraq War on intelligence later judged to be flawed.

The Chilcot Inquiry found that Blair acted without certainty about weapons of mass destruction and failed to plan adequately for the aftermath.

His judgement in high-stakes foreign interventions is highly questionable. Will his past mistakes be repeated in Gaza?

Blair’s political allegiances also fuel scepticism.

His close ties to the United States and well-documented sympathies for Israel make him appear far from neutral in a territory where legitimacy depends on the perception of impartiality.

Even during his tenure as Middle East envoy for the Quartet of international powers – a role in which he focused on economic development, institution-building, and promoting a two-state solution – he drew criticism for technocratic approaches that critics argued prioritized foreign investment and Western models over Palestinian political self-determination.

For many Palestinians, Blair is not a trusted mediator but a representative of external interests.

How, then, could the GITA gain local legitimacy under his leadership?

Internationally, Blair’s appointment could also provoke friction.

Israel, Egypt, Gulf states, and even European powers may try to push the proposed authority into serving their own objectives.

The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank may feel sidelined.

Hamas, excluded from government, could act as a spoiler.

Rconciling these interests while addressing Gaza’s humanitarian crisis, rebuilding infrastructure, and restoring civil administration is a delicate balancing act. Is Blair really the man for that job?

Operationally, the transitional authority faces enormous practical hurdles.

Gaza remains under blockade – its borders, airspace, and maritime access tightly controlled by Israel and Egypt.

Delivering reconstruction materials, staffing government functions, and providing basic services will require constant negotiation and cooperation from multiple actors, many of whom may have competing priorities.

The authority’s mandate to dismantle Hamas and maintain security could easily trigger renewed violence if not carefully managed.

The GITA would, in effect, become a temporary government, with the enormous responsibilities of sovereignty but without the guarantees of legitimacy or stability.

And Blair is a leading candidate to lead it?

His international stature, familiarity with Middle Eastern politics, and network of contacts may make him attractive to diplomats seeking a figurehead who can manage a post-war agenda – but history and logic suggest that those things are no guarantee of success, especially when marred by previous foreign policy controversies and accusations of bias.

For Gazans, the prospect of Blair overseeing their lives — even temporarily — may be an imposition of external will rather than a path to self-determination.

With his record, how will he build trust among a population traumatised by conflict and occupation?

His appointment would be a bare-faced display of the stark reality of international diplomacy, in which decisions are often based on strategic convenience and global power calculations rather than reason, fairness… or consent.

Blair’s potential return to the world stage highlights the contradictions of present-day international diplomacy.

The risks are immense: failure to deliver, loss of local legitimacy, renewed conflict, and accusations of neo-imperial interference.

That Blair is hotly tipped for the role despite these overwhelming concerns reminds us that, in geopolitics, reason and common sense rarely govern the selection of those tasked with shaping the lives of millions.

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